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Abstract— The idea of paying people for their data is in-
creasingly seen as a promising direction for resolving privacy
debates, improving the quality of online data, and even offering
an alternative to labour-based compensation in a future domi-
nated by automation and self-operating machines. In this paper
we demonstrate how a Human-Centric Data Economy would
compensate the users of an online streaming service. We borrow
the notion of the Shapley value from cooperative game theory
to define what a fair compensation for each user should be for
movie scores offered to the recommender system of the service.
Since determining the Shapley value exactly is computationally
inefficient in the general case, we derive faster alternatives using
clustering, dimensionality reduction, and partial information.
We apply our algorithms to a movie recommendation data set
and demonstrate that different users may have a vastly different
value for the service. We also analyse the reasons that some
movie ratings may be more valuable than others and discuss
the consequences for compensating users fairly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data, and the economy around it, are said to be driving
the fourth industrial revolution. Interestingly – the people –
whose data is what moves the new economy, have a rather
passive role in it, as they are left outside the direct value
flow that transforms raw data into huge monetary benefits.
This is a consequence of the de facto understanding (or one
may say misunderstanding) between people and companies,
that the former get unpaid access to online services in
exchange for unpaid access to their personal data. This is
increasingly being challenged by various voices who call
for the establishment of a new, renegotiated, relationship
between users and services. Indeed, a variety of pathologies
can be traced back to the way the data economy has been
working so far. Some are direct and obvious, such as privacy
risks for individuals, and market failures and dangers for the
economy from the rise of data monopolies and oligopolies.
Others are less obvious, and further reaching into the future,
such as mass unemployment due to data-driven automation.
It was estimated recently [1] that, if automation due to
artificial intelligence reaches maturity and fair remuneration
algorithms are set in place, a family of four could earn up to
$20,000 per year from their data. The idea of micropayments,
or providing small contributions to users in exchange for
their presence on a platform or for accessing a service,
is of course much older. In the pre-World Wide Web era,
France developed a videotex online service called Minitel,
that included micropayments as part of its design, but Jaron
Lannier brought it to public attention in 2013, in his book
”Who owns the future?”[2]. In it, he argues that we have
only underwent half of the Data Revolution, the part that
compensates users with implicit benefits, but not the part
that also compensates them with explicit monetary benefits.
There have been a series of proposed approaches for how
this compensation might materialise. The simplest, at least
in theory, would be to assign a context-free value to data, a
kind of dollar-per-bit measure. This has been proven to be
very hard [3], [4], [5], [12]. Indeed, since the value of data
is strongly connected to its intended use, it becomes very
difficult to argue about how to assign an a priori average
value. For traditional currencies, we are able to have a
context-free appreciation of their value for the simple reason
that we have been using these currencies long enough to
be able to do so. Although we clearly understand nowadays
that one’s browsing and mobility patterns, social network, or
past purchases all have value, we are far from being able
to appreciate how much this value is in terms of dollars
or euros. The latter is further complicated by our inability
to tell in advance, by how many parties, and how many
times, a piece of data may be utilized. As an analogy, selling
an individual’s data, or rather renting it temporarily, is as
difficult and risky as renting an infinitely fast vehicle, with no
gas and maintenance costs, and without any prior restrictions
with regard to mileage or the person driving it.
A second proposed method has been to compensate users
for their privacy damage [13], [14]. Processing massive
amounts of data can lead to privacy infringements, such as
the leakage of habitual user behavior, their location or other
personal identifiable information (PII). Users are thus seen
as victims who must be compensated for their damage.
Our approach is different, we consider users as active
partners in the data value chain. Such a chain requires a
business model, smart predictive algorithms for extracting
useful information from raw data and online marketing for
attracting and retaining users, among many others. The
fundamental component of the value chain, however, is the
user, and it is ultimately a matter of common sense that they
should be rewarded in a fair manner, which may or may not
exceed the perceived privacy-related damages.
In a Human-Centric Data Economy, when a transaction,
or set of transactions, is converted, a proportion of the
obtained revenue will be returned to the users. Defining the
right amount to be returned to the users is difficult, as it
depends on many market characteristics of a multilateral
value chain, such as competition and user loyalty [6]. In
this paper, we assume that the total amount of revenue to
be redistributed to users is given, e.g., 5% or 10%, or any
other number produced by the competition between services
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
01
13
7v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 27
 A
ug
 20
19
within a given sector. We thus turn our attention to the next
important question, namely: given a fixed total amount to be
distributed, how should this distribution be performed? How
should different users be compensated based on the value of
the data that they contribute to a specific service?
One obvious answer would be to split the sum by the
number of users on the platform. This may not be fair
however, because it is unreasonable to assume that all
users contribute equally to the service. In the case of a
recommendation system, for example, some users may rate
and view hundreds of items, while others may have a
much sparser activity. Another example would be a traffic
application. Users who travel regularly through a given area
and constantly provide feed-back, may be more relevant to
the platform than occasional passers-by. Even at an equal
level of intensity, some movie scores, or location data may be
more important for a recommender than others. For example
a score for a blockbuster movie that just aired may be
more important than a score for a well known (and voted)
blockbuster movie. Similarly, speed information for a known-
to-be-congested route is less useful to a navigation app than
speed data for an unknown alternative route with less traffic.
Another important point to understand is that the Data
Economy is not a zero-sum game. Paying users for data need
not be seen as a measure that will reduce the revenue or
profitability of online services. More and better data can lead
to better services and thus more revenue and profit. It is thus
not surprising that the vision of paying directly or through
taxes for data has received positive comments from industry
leaders such as Bill Gates [7], Elon Musk [8] and Mark
Zuckerberg [9]. Also, despite not happening today, there is a
realistic path that can lead to wide adoption. It only requires
that a small number of visionary companies start offering
micro-payments to get a competitive advantage in terms of
user retention, for others to follow, and the practice to get
traction in the online services market.
Our paper brings a threefold technical contribution towards
the realisation of a Human-Centric Data Economy:
• We define data payoff fairness in terms of accepted
economic notions. Specifically, we use the Shapley
value from collaborative game theory to define how
to split a total payback among all the users that have
provided data to a revenue-generating online service.
We also sketch a Contribution-Reward framework for
implementing such paybacks in practice.
• We develop two algorithms that can provide efficient
estimates of the Shapley value, which in its raw form
does not scale for large data sets. The first one applies
minibatch k-Means with N d-dimensional points, for
k clusters and t iterations directly on the definition
of Shapley to reduce the complexity from O(N !) to
O(Nkdt + k!), where k, d, t  N . The second is a
O(N2) heuristic of local information that does not use
the Shapley definition.
• We apply the above algorithms to a movie scoring data
set and study how different users may be in terms of
their value for their service. We observe that some users
Users Dataset Feature Importance and
User Contribution
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Fig. 1. The Contribution-Reward framework. In establishing the proportion
of each user’s contribution, one first determines important features or
relevant measures that result in revenue. One such measure could be the
number of useful recommendations obtained from a recommender system.
After a measure or relevant feature has been identified, user contributions to
it are computed and users are ordered in a hierarchy. Based on their place
in the value hierarchy, they are remunerated.
may be as much as ×4 more valuable than others.
• Finally, we study how scoring behaviour impacts on
user value. We find that what differentiates a “good”
user from a “bad” one is that the good user tends
to vote mainly for the most popular movies and is
consistent with the movie popularity hierarchy, namely
popular movies get high ratings and unpopular ones,
low ratings. By contrast, users at the other end of the
value distribution tend to vote and provide high scores
to unpopular movies as well.
While human centricity and fairness need to reside at the
core of the proposed framework, transparency must also be
considered. Users need a method of verifying for themselves
the amount of payment received and be able to connect their
behaviour on an online platform to the obtained revenue, in
a clearly interpretable manner. We discuss how to do this via
an accounting meta-data layer at the end of the article.
II. BACKGROUND
In the Background section, we introduce the Contribution-
Reward framework and describe the setting for our two algo-
rithms – a recommender system generating recommendations
for the users of an online movie streaming service. We also
introduce the Shapley value, as the backbone of the first
proposed algorithm and also an accepted point of reference
in terms of fair credit distribution. The section ends with
a toy example that shows how the exact Shapley value is
computed in a simple two-user setting.
A. The Contribution-Reward Framework
The proposed Contribution-Reward framework, depicted
in Fig. 1, aims to provide users with a remuneration scheme
that is both fair and sustainable. With usage, the service
2
gathers and stores relevant data. Based on the data type, a
number of important features are chosen and the contribution
of each user to the said features is estimated. Finally, the
user receives a repayment from the platform, proportional to
their estimated contribution. The difficulty of finding the said
estimation resides in the need to first observe which are the
relevant features that make a data set valuable. In the case
of recommendation data, for example, it could be that users
voting for the most popular movies, thus contributing to an
already existing hierarchy, are considered more valuable, or
on the contrary, users reviewing items which are initially
unpopular could bring an element of novelty, and thus a
higher overall value. On the other hand, if the accuracy and
update rate of the data set are essential, for example in traffic
applications, users with a higher contribution frequency may
be considered of higher value.
It thus becomes clear that user value depends on the struc-
ture of the data and its intended use. Due to this subjective
nature, deriving a generally-applicable valuation framework
is not a straightforward task. The question we raise here
is two-fold: first, how can one determine a hierarchy of
value for a given set of users and a particular use case
(recommender systems) and second, how can one quantify
the position of each user in the value hierarchy? An answer
to the second question is of particular importance, since if
one can assign scores to users, based on their contributions,
one can then define a mapping from these scores to an actual
financial amount.
For the rest of this paper, the setting is thus fixed: a
recommender system is trained on a training set, consisting
of movie reviews, and then makes predictions on a separate
test set. If the recommendations made to a user, on the test
set, have an error below a fixed threshold, we consider that
there is a high likelihood that the user will want to watch
the recommended item. We refer to these recommendations
as ”clicks”. As such, when we say: ”user A has generated
5 clicks”, this is to be interpreted as ”the recommender has
made 5 recommendations to user A, all with an error below
our set threshold”. Clicks here play the role of the important
feature in the Contribution-Reward framework.
The most naı¨ve approach would be to train the recom-
mender system by removing one user at a time, and counting
the difference in the overall number of clicks obtained on the
test set. There are a series of disadvantages to this: first, a
data set may contain reviews from hundreds of thousands of
users, quickly making the leave-one-out training computa-
tionally unfeasible. The second drawback resides in the fact
that removing only a single user may not have the expected
result on the recommender. Indeed, if the user provides a
significant amount of novelty, it may happen that the system
produces more clicks in the absence of the user than in their
presence, leading to a negative assigned value. This would
further be difficult to map to a monetary contribution. In
the following sections, we present two alternative methods
which avoid these shortcomings and can be implemented in
a computationally-scalable way.
After a theoretical discussion of the proposed algorithms,
they are applied to a case study based on a subset of the
MovieLens data set [15], depicting how groups of users
can contribute differently to the overall performance of the
recommender system, and thus hold different values with
respect to the service.
B. Introducing the Shapley Value
Credit assignment in cooperative games has long been a
central problem of cooperative game theory. To this end,
Shapley [16], [17] proposed that players should be rewarded
in a manner proportional to their average marginal contribu-
tion to the payoff of any coalition they could join.
Let N be a set of N players and S ⊂ N be a coalition
with cost v(S). The Shapley value is a uniquely determined
vector of the form (φ1(v), ..., φn(v)), where the element
representing player i is given by
φi(v) =
1
N !
∑
pi∈SN
[v(S(pi, i))− v(S(pi, i) \ i)], (1)
where pi is a permutation representing the arrival order of
set N , while S(pi, i) represents the set of players that have
arrived into the system before player i.
The Shapley value satisfies a series of important proper-
ties:
• Efficiency: the total gain is completely distributed
among the players∑
i∈N
φi(v) = v(N ) (2)
• Symmetry: if i and j are two players who bring equal
contributions, in the sense that, for every subset S that
contains neither i nor j, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), then
their respective Shapley values are also equal, φi(v) =
φj(v).
• Linearity: if two coalition games, denoted v and w are
combined, the resulting gain is the sum of the gains
derived from each game separately
φi(v + w) = φi(v) + φi(w) (3)
and also φi(α · v) = α · φi(v), for any real α.
• Null player: the Shapley value of a null player is
zero. A player is considered null if they do not bring a
contribution to any possible coalition.
Unfortunately, the Shapley value has also been proven to
be NP-hard for many domains [18], [19], [20]. Since it takes
into account all possible coalitions, for each user, the number
of terms scales with N !, where N represents the number of
users, such that it quickly becomes computationally unfeasi-
ble.
In Ref. [21] the authors use Monte Carlo to approximate
the Shapley value for computing the cost contribution of
individual households to the peak hour traffic and costs
of an Internet Service Provider (ISP). In that case, the
relatively simpler structure of the problem made Monte Carlo
an appropriate technique for approximating Shapley. Other
recent works have presented approximation algorithms for
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Shapley for specific problems of lower complexity than
recommendation [10], [11]. In the context of the current
proposal, the inherent higher complexity of the considered
value functions v() that may represent the workings of com-
plex ML algorithms for things like recommendation, makes
using Monte Carlo inaccurate according to our preliminary
tests. Instead, we intend to use clustering to reduce the input
size of the problem. Our approach will be to first group
users in a number of clusters according to the similarity of
their movie ratings (or trajectories in the case of mobility
related applications), and then compute the Shapley value
of each cluster instead of each user. By controlling the
number of clusters we can make the computation as precise
and complex as our computing resources allow. In Section
III we will apply this method in the case of a movie
recommendation data set, containing an amount of users for
which the exact computation of Eq. 1 is not possible.
C. A Toy Example
The purpose of this section is to provide a very simple
example of computing the Shapley value for the case of
two users. Consider an artificial data set, containing movie
recommendations from two different users. The predictions
made by the recommender are the net contribution in our
case. We start from the marginal contributions V ({1}) = 12
and V ({2}) = 15, which would mean that the presence
of user 1 alone in the data set, causes the recommender to
produce 12 useful movie recommendations, and the presence
of user 2 alone results in 15 useful recommendations. Let
us further assume that the presence of both users, simultane-
ously, increases the number of recommendations to 28, hence
V ({1, 2}) = 28. Since it is clear that the two contributions
are not equal, the following question arises: how can we find
a factor, proportional to the user contributions, that would be
useful in determining a fair repayment ?
For this, we compute the Shapley value, as defined in
Eq. 1. We first note that there are two possible orders
of arrival of the users, with equally likely probabilities of
occurrence: [1, 2] or [2, 1]. In the first situation, user 1 comes
first, bringing a contribution of V ({1}) = 12, followed
by user 2, who increases the overall useful contribution to
V ({1, 2}) = 28, thus, the net contributions of the two users,
for this particular order of arrival are
φ[1,2](1) = V ({1}) = 12,
φ[1,2](2) = V ({1, 2})− V ({1}) = 28− 12 = 16.
In the second case, the order of arrival is reversed, namely
[2, 1]. User 2 arrives first, bringing a contribution V ({2}) =
15, followed by user 1 who increases the net contribution to
V ({1, 2}) = 28, thus
φ[2,1](1) = V ({1, 2})− V ({2}) = 28− 15 = 13,
φ[2,1](2) = V ({2}) = 15.
Since the two cases are equally probable, the Shapley
value is the sum of the two marginal contributions multiplied
by the probability of the order of arrival (or of the factorial
of the number of users)
φ(1) =
1
2!
· (φ[1,2](1) + φ[2,1](1)) = 12.5,
φ(2) =
1
2!
· (φ[1,2](2) + φ[2,1](2)) = 15.5.
We thus see that the average marginal contribution of user
2 is higher than the one of user 1, and based on this factor,
we can devise a scheme of fair remuneration, to be presented
as part of the Contribution-Reward framework.
It is also worth noting that, in order to compute the Shap-
ley terms, we need to compute N ! marginal contributions,
which leads to scaling problems if an exact computation
of the Shapley value is required. The methods presented in
this paper provide ways of overcoming this obstacle through
various approximate approaches.
III. USER VALUE ESTIMATION
In this section we first present and then apply the two
proposed algorithms. We then discuss the results obtained on
a subset of the MovieLens data set. At the end of this section
and in the next, we will interpret user behaviour and try
to understand what is the relationship between votes given,
number of votes, types of movies reviewed and the assigned
user value.
A. Approximate Shapley Value Estimation (ASVE)
The first user contribution estimation method is based
on the Shapley value, described in the previous sections.
The algorithm is constructed around a recommender system
framework and we choose our value of interest to be the
number of ”clicks” or useful recommendations that the model
provides, for a given data set. The pseudocode for this
algorithm is provided as Algorithm 1.
The input data consists of user identifiers, product iden-
tifiers (movie categorical IDs) and votes. From Eq. 1 we
observe that computing the Shapley value of each user in
the data set directly is unfeasible, as the computational
complexity is of order N ! where N (the number of users
in the data set) is typically extremely large (in the order
of hundreds of thousands or even millions for services like
YouTube and NetFlix). Clearly such an approach does not
scale.
There are two plausible directions one can pursue in order
to avoid the complexity barrier. The first is to attempt to
estimate the Shapley value using Monte Carlo sampling, as
done in Ref. [21]. The second, which we shall employ here,
takes advantage of the similarities between user behavioural
patterns. In general, when treating data related to user
preference, consumers tend to cluster into a limited number
of similar groups.
For example there may be individuals with a stronger
preference for action movies as opposed to romantic ones.
Exploiting such relationships allows us to greatly simplify
the estimate of a user’s contribution to the overall data set.
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Algorithm 1 Approximate Shapley Value Estimation
1: procedure ASVE
2: # Cluster the users based on behaviour.
3: clusteredData, clusterLabels← Cluster(inputData)
4: clusterCoalitions← Compute(clusterLabels)
5: # Compute the total number of clicks.
6: K ← TrainPredict(inputDataset)
7: # Compute marginal contribution of every possible coalition.
8: # trainData and predData contain only clusters from coalition.
9: for S in clusterCoalitions do
10: VS ← TrainPredict(trainData, predData)
11: # Create all possible permutations of complete cluster coalitions.
12: # and compute the marginal contribution of each cluster.
13: perm← Permute(clusterLabels)
14: for pi in perm do
15: for i in clusterLabels do
16: Vi ← V (pi)− V (pi − {i})
17: margContrib[i] += Vi
18: for i in clusterLabels do
19: φi =
1
len(clusterLabels)! ∗ sum(margContrib[i])
20: # Compute the value of every user.
21: for userId in clusteredData do
22: φ˜1(userId) = (
∑
k
φk
1+EuclideanDist(user, centroid(k)) )
23: userValSum += φ˜1(userId)
24: # Normalize user values to respect efficiency condition.
25: for userId in clusteredData do
26: φ1(userId) = φ˜1(userId) · KuserValSum
Algorithm 2 Neighbourhood Similarity Value Estimation
1: procedure NSVE
2: Rec = 0
3: # Train model once to obtain the total number of clicks.
4: K ← TrainPredict(inputDataset)
5: # For all neighbors in a neighbourhood, compute the user’s
6: # predictive potential
7: for userId in inputDataset do
8: neighbors← FindNeighbors(inputDataset, userId)
9: for id in neighbors do
10: newItems← IntersectLeft(userId, id)
11: Rec+ = 1
12: RecList.append(Rec)
13: Rec← 0
14: # Scale the predictive potential by the total
15: # number of clicks divided by the sum of the predictive
16: # potentials, to respect the efficiency condition.
17: for userRec in RecList do
18: φ3(userId)← K*userRec∑
j userRecj
The algorithm starts by clustering the input data, prior to
which, a dimensionality reduction method (such as PCA)
is applied. The next step is the calculation of all possible
coalitions of clusters. For example, for three clusters, these
are
{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3},
where {1} represents a data set where only the users corre-
sponding to the first clusters are present. The recommender
system is then trained on the filtered data sets, corresponding
only to the clusters in the above coalitions. A train-test
split is performed prior to this, but omitted in line 8 of
the pseudocode for clarity. During the prediction phase, the
model makes recommendations to users and also provides
an error estimate for each recommendation. We assert that,
for errors under a certain threshold, the recommendations
can be valuable, and we refer to these recommendations as
”clicks” for the rest of this paper, in analogy to advertising
recommendations where, if the user is interested in an advert,
they will click the banner.
After obtaining the number of clicks for every one of
the possible subsets of clusters, one must compute the
marginal contribution of the cluster. This takes into account
every possible complete coalition, where the order of arrival
matters. For example, in our three user case, all possible
complete coalitions are: {1, 2, 3}, {2, 1, 3} and {3, 2, 1}. The
relevant code is between lines 11 - 19.
Finally, when the Shapley value (computed in line 19)
for each cluster is known, we can proceed to determine the
value of each individual user. For this, the centroid of the
cluster is labeled with the corresponding Shapley value of the
cluster. Thus, the value of each user is equal to the sum of all
individual cluster values divided by the Euclidean distance
between the point, representing the user, and the respective
cluster centroid, with one added for stability. The assigned
values, from both proposed algorithms, are then scaled with
the total number of clicks produced by the recommender, on
the complete data set, to ensure that the efficiency condition
is met. In this manner, to every point on a projected two-
dimensional surface, representing the space of all users, we
can assign an approximate Shapley value.
We have applied the ASVE algorithm to a subset of the
MovieLens data set, containing 92,394 total ratings on 4,180
movies from 610 users, with the intent on understanding if
the value hierarchy provided by the method can be intuitively
understood. First, the users were separated into three classes,
the best users (representing the ones with the highest scores
given by the ASVE method), average users and bad users.
We considered whether or not there is a relationship between
movie popularity (based on the overall number of ratings a
movie has received) and the vote distribution of the three
classes of users.
In Fig. 2, the user vote distributions are presented, for the
three classes of users. The movies are grouped into equal-
sized ordered buckets, with their popularity decreasing in
the positive direction of the horizontal axis. We observe that
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Fig. 2. User vote distributions based on movie popularity for the ASVE method. Votes from the most valuable users are shown in red, those from average
users in blue and votes from the least valuable users are shown in green. For clarity, the movies have been grouped into ordered buckets, with popularity
decreasing in the positive direction of the horizontal axis.
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Fig. 3. User vote distributions based on movie popularity for the NSVE method. Votes from the most valuable users are shown in red, those from average
users in blue and votes from the least valuable users are shown in green. For clarity, the movies have been grouped into ordered buckets, with popularity
decreasing in the positive direction of the horizontal axis.
users which the ASVE method considers as being the most
valuable, tend to vote mostly on popular movies, whereas
users considered to have low value, have a more widespread
distribution of votes. This reinforces our initial assumption
that the ASVE method gives high scores to users who agree
with a predetermined hierarchy, not necessarily to users with
a novel contribution.
One remark that must be made is that, by design, the
application of ASVE requires one prior check. When re-
moving a cluster of users, it is entirely possible that one or
more clusters provide a negative contribution. It is therefore
essential that one checks the values assigned to the clusters
for non-negativity, prior to applying the method to individual
users.
B. Neighbourhood Similarity Value Estimation (NSVE)
The second approach relies on first reducing the dimen-
sionality of the data set (similar to ASVE) and creating a
neighbourhood around each user. Based on the predictive
capability of the user on its neighbours, one can approximate
the user’s importance.
The algorithm works as follows: first, the recommender
system is trained on the complete data set and a total number
of clicks (similar to the previous method) is obtained (line
4). For each user in the data set, we then construct a neigh-
bourhood and observe the number of items that the central
user has rated, and the neighbours have not. These elements
act as an estimator of the user’s ”predictive potential”. For
example, if user A has seen and rated movies M1, M2 and
M5 and user B, which is in user A’s neighbourhood, has only
seen movie M1 (out of the list that user A has rated overall),
then A could potentially recommend movies M2 and M5 to
B, so we say that ”A has a predictive potential of 2 (movies)
over B). This predictive potential is then used, in line 18, to
proportionately assign clicks (from the total number K) to
each user, based on their respective predictive potentials.
One must keep in mind that the size of the neighbourhood
is a hyperparameter that must be determined through trial
and error. Furthermore, there may be other distance metrics,
other than the Euclidean distance, chosen here, that could
potentially offer a better estimate, however, for simplicity,
we restrict ourselves to Euclidean distances in the present
paper.
In order to compare the two methods, a proper scaling
must be found for the two corresponding distributions. The
unscaled distributions, shown in Fig. 4 are correlated, with
a correlation distance of 0.29 (0 representing a perfect
correlation) for the MovieLens data set. We were thus able
to learn an approximate mapping, that would project the
second distribution to the domain of the first, making a direct
comparison possible, as depicted in Fig. 5.
Due to the nature of this mapping being approximate,
one sees artefacts, such as the unusually tall peaks of
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Fig. 4. The ASVE distribution, shown in blue, and the unscaled NSVE
distribution, shown in orange. It is important to note that, even though the
variance of the two distributions is different, the user value hierarchy is
maintained to a large degree.
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Fig. 5. The ASVE distribution, in blue, and scaled NSVE distribution,
in orange, showing artefacts due to the approximate mapping between the
two.
the projected NSVE distribution, compared to its ASVE
counterpart. While this is an issue that needs to be considered
when comparing method predictions, the mapping process
would not be necessary in a real-world implementation, as
it’s sole purpose is to aid the comparison, and would be
irrelevant for the purpose of credit assignment.
Having the two distributions on the same scale, we con-
tinued our investigation by asking whether or not the second
method produces the same distribution of user votes, based
on movie popularity. As seen in Fig 3, both methods agree
on the fact that users considered valuable tend to vote for
popular movies.
It is instructive, at this point, to also see how users voted,
based on movie popularity, that is, is it the case that more
popular movies got higher ratings than less popular ones?
Also, how do the three classes of users rate movies of various
levels of popularity?
In Fig. 6, we present the vote distribution by user cate-
gory. Rather surprisingly, there is somewhat little difference
between users considered very valuable and those considered
average, as both classes seem to give high scores to very pop-
ular movies and low scores to unpopular ones. Less valuable
users (according to both methods) seem to offer high scores
to a wide array of movies, going against the established
popularity hierarchy. This further serves to confirm that users
reinforcing an existing order are rated higher.
One point to notice is that, in the case of the NSVE, by
design a user cannot have a negative assigned value, thus
no prior checks are required, as in the case of ASVE. A
potential problem here is the reliance of the method on
the neighbourhood radius hyperparameter, which strongly
depends on the data set. Furthermore, users outside a given
neighbourhood have zero contribution to the final rating of
the neighbourhood source. This is in stark contrast to the
smooth value assignment of ASVE, and does give rise to a
series of artefacts, one of which being that there are always
(or at least in all practical situations) users with an assigned
zero value, which raises the difficulty of mapping this to an
actual financial amount.
A second artefact can be observed once we ask the
question: how many clicks do movies generate (over all users
in a fixed test set) based on their popularity? As can be seen
in Fig. 7, the Neighbourhood-based method is very sensitive
to the relative distance between users. As movies become
less popular and users who vote for them get spread over
larger distances, the amount of clicks generated (which in
the case of NSVE represent movies that the central user
can recommend to its immediate neighbours) quickly falls to
zero. Thus, NSVE strongly favors users who vote for popular
movies, where users who favor them cluster together.
From a computational standpoint, the NSVE algorithm
only requires one training of the recommender, in order
to obtain the total number of clicks. The neighbourhood
comparison operations are linear. Another advantage of this
method is that, if applied to a production environment, the
model would continuously train as new user data becomes
available, and only be required to perform occasional infer-
ence, to update the total number of clicks.
Another potential impediment to both methods is their
sensitivity to badly-labelled data. If, for example, in our
movie data set, the tags describing the movie genre are
not consistent or worse, misleading, this will affect the
distances between users and result in both methods providing
inaccurate value estimates. Therefore, data cleaning and a
careful analysis of the data set are important, before the
algorithms are employed.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the previous section, we have presented two credit-
assignment methods that could become part of an online
service, and transform users into active participants in the
information value flow, from its raw form to the final gen-
erated revenue. As the main producers of raw data, fairness
requires that users share part of the resulting revenue, in a
manner proportional to the significance of their data.
We have proposed two different methods that are in
agreement on a few key points. The first method is based on
the commonly-used Shapley value, which is approximated
by being computed at cluster level. The users are then
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Fig. 6. Movie ratings given by the three user classes, sorted by movie popularity. The average ratings from the best users (over both methods) are depicted
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Fig. 7. Movie votes and number of clicks generated by the corresponding bucket, according to the two credit-assignment methods. The overall number
of votes is shown in blue, the number of clicks that movies in the corresponding bucket generate are shown in orange, for ASVE and green for NSVE.
scored based on their relative distance from the cluster
centers. The second method exploits user similarity, creating
a neighbourhood around each user, where users with similar
preferences may be found. It is thus assumed that the items
the central user can recommend are close to the interests of
his neighbours, such that they become potential clicks. This
is a very crude, but also very effective method for performing
distance-based recommendations.
We have seen that the two algorithms provide consistent
predictions on key aspects such as the distribution of user
votes based on their attributed value, the score given by users
based on the same attributed value and the number of clicks
movies produce, based on their popularity. These come to
confirm our initial hypothesis, based on intuition, that users
receiving high scores vote in line with the item’s popularity
level. There are, however, points where the two methods do
not agree. The NSVE is more sensitive to distances between
users in the projected plane. In areas where the users are
sparsely distributed, NSVE tends to assign zero values to
them. This is not the case for the ASVE algorithm, as
belonging to a cluster ensures a non-zero contribution to the
final outcome.
Also as a result of the sharp cut-off at the neighborhood’s
boundary, the scores assigned to users by the Shapley-based
method change in a much smoother and more continuous
manner from one region to another. This reflects itself in a
much narrower distribution (as seen in Fig. 4). In contrast, the
user score distribution of the NSVE method has a very high
variance, assigning very small scores to users who are far
apart and very high scores to the ones in densely-populated
regions.
One issue not yet discussed is how should new users
be treated, with respect to their overall value. As their
contribution is minimal, a valid argument would be to start by
assigning them relatively small scores (hence small propor-
tional payments). This is indeed the case for both methods.
Considering ASVE, a new user would likely be far from
the center of any cluster, and, as the proportional payment
decreases linearly with the distance from the cluster center,
would get a small reward. For NSVE the situation is rather
similar, a new user would either be in a sparsely-populated
area of the projected space or in a densely-populated area
but having very few possible recommendations for their
neighbours. In either case, they would receive a small score.
Finally, what should be the impact of low votes? This
question is of particular importance if either of the two
proposed algorithms is to be implemented in a realistic
setting. Observing Fig. 6, we see that valuable users give
high votes to popular films and low votes for unpopular
ones. If this rule were to hold for a vast array of data sets,
users could attempt to game the system, by voting based on
popularity and hence obtaining a high reward. This is also a
problem that stems from the objective of the two methods,
namely maximizing the number of clicks for each item and
not necessarily considering the element of novelty brought
into the system by each individual.
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V. CONCLUSION
The current business model for online services is reaching
the limits of sustainability. The exchange of free services for
free data raises concerns both in terms of safety, with users
allowing highly sensitive private information to be used as a
currency, and also in terms of fairness, as an ever increasing
number of voices call for an evaluation of the real worth of
an individual’s online impact.
In the present paper, we have proposed a framework to
determine the value of every user for an online service,
based on their contribution to a quantity or metric of interest.
The proposed framework must be fair, such that users are
rewarded proportionally to their contribution and transparent,
the payments need to be interpretable and linked to user
behaviour on the platform.
By restricting ourselves to the specific case of a rec-
ommender system, we aim to gain an understanding of
what type of behaviour increases the overall worth of an
individual to the service. Once the profile of valuable users
has been studied on a series of particular cases, our goal is to
generalize and establish value in a broader sense. A second
direction of future research is the creation of a transparent
accounting meta-data layer that users can access to make
sure that they have been fairly compensated, and do that in
a manner that does not harm their privacy by leaking data.
As our goal is to ultimately expand our analysis to a broad
spectrum of domains, the proposed Contribution-Reward
framework aims to be as wide-reaching as possible. There are
no mentions regarding the types of data or its use cases. The
framework simply states that, once a set of important features
or relevant metrics can be identified, based on data type and
use case, a value hierarchy for users can be established. The
selection of the metrics or features is done in terms of their
impact on the overall revenue produced by the service, and
this selection may not be a trivial procedure. Once this has
been achieved, however, the second step of the framework is
the ranking of users, and this can be done with algorithms
similar to the ones proposed in our case study. The obstacles
reside not only in determining the value of an individual, but
also in ensuring the safety of their data and fairness of their
remuneration. Once every user has been assigned a score, the
final step of the framework consists in mapping the scores
to actual financial quantities. This is certainly not a static
map, as it may depend on a series of continuously-varying
parameters, such as revenue produced, amount of revenue
to be distributed among users and possibly even exchange
rates between different currencies. In this paper we cover
the second problem, which is concerned with ranking.
Following this line of reasoning, we have presented two
algorithms for assigning proportional value to users, for a
specific task. We then saw that these algorithms do agree
on a number of points, despite the fact that both rely on
approximations. We also introduced the exact method for
determining proportional contributions, the Shapley value,
which in its raw form does not scale to large coalitions,
but can serve as a reference or the basis for approximate
methods.
The predictions of the two algorithms are in line with
common-sense assessments of the value of a particular user,
for example with respect to their votes for the most popular,
and hence revenue-producing movies. While this does offer
further validation of the two methods, their limitations have
also been highlighted, and these stem from the fact that
both are, to different degrees, estimates of an exact but
uncomputable estimate.
As this field, which may aptly be named Data Economics
is still in its infancy, the number of research directions
is rather considerable. One such path would be to treat
other particular cases, such as traffic data and the case of
a traffic application, and understand the reasons behind the
difference in value for various types of users. One can then
hope that, having understood a number of such cases, they
will provide some intuition into possible generalizations. A
different research direction would be to address the other
two components of the reward framework, namely feature
or metric identification and score-to-currency mapping.
An important aspect of our future work is designing and
implementing a layer of transparency in the Contribution-
Reward framework, with the explicit aim of allowing users to
verify the manner in which their repayments are distributed
and connected to their behaviour. Transparency is a funda-
mental characteristic, as it will both increase user confidence
in regard to participating on a platform which implements the
proposed framework; and growing confidence will, in turn,
boost user presence and, hence, generated revenue.
The purpose of the present paper has been to first pose a
series of essential questions in Data Economics, especially
related to fair credit assignment, and to show that, for a
particular use case, a transparent algorithmic solution can
be found, based on a commonly-accepted economic method,
the Shapley value. It is our hope that, as our data economy
reaches maturity, the remaining open problems in the field
will soon be addressed.
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